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The Emperor’s Dilemma: A Computational
Model of Self-Enforcing Norms1
Damon Centola, Robb Willer, and Michael Macy
Cornell University
The authors demonstrate the uses of agent-based computational
models in an application to a social enigma they call the “emperor’s
dilemma,” based on the Hans Christian Andersen fable. In this
model, agents must decide whether to comply with and enforce a
norm that is supported by a few fanatics and opposed by the vast
majority. They find that cascades of self-reinforcing support for a
highly unpopular norm cannot occur in a fully connected social
network. However, if agents’ horizons are limited to immediate
neighbors, highly unpopular norms can emerge locally and then
spread. One might expect these cascades to be more likely as the
number of “true believers” increases, and bridge ties are created
between otherwise distant actors. Surprisingly, the authors observed
quite the opposite effects.
Naturally, the best proof of the sincerity of your confession was
your naming others whom you had seen in the Devil company.
–Arthur Miller, 1996
THE POPULAR ENFORCEMENT OF UNPOPULAR NORMS
In “The Emperor’s New Clothes” Hans Christian Andersen ([1837] 1998)
tells the story of three rogues who sell a foolish monarch a nonexistent
robe that they claim cannot be seen by those who are “unfit for office”
or “incorrigibly stupid.” Fear of exposure leads the emperor, and in turn,
each of the citizens, to express admiration for the new clothes, which then
1 The authors wish to express their gratitude to Andreas Flache for help with Voronoi
diagrams and to the National Science Foundation for their support of Centola through
an IGERT fellowship in nonlinear dynamics and Macy and Willer through grant SPS
0241657. The authors also thank the Fetzer Institute for support of Macy and the
Javitz Foundation for support of Willer. Direct correspondence to Damon Centola,
Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853. E-mail:
dc288@cornell.edu
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reinforces the illusion of widespread support for the norm. The spell is
broken when a child, innocent of the norm, laughs at the naked old man.
It is not hard to find everyday examples of this fable in the academic
kingdom. We can all think of prestigious scholars who are widely pro-
claimed as having the most brilliant new ideas, yet privately, people find
the work entirely incomprehensible. Some may worry that perhaps they
are indeed inadequate—that those who cannot see these beautiful ideas
must be “incorrigibly stupid.” Others are quite certain that the emperor
is naked but worry about being dismissed as an intellectual lightweight
by enthusiasts who clearly seem to understand and appreciate every word.
The safest course is to go along with the charade and admire the em-
peror—thereby reinforcing this same false belief among our colleagues.
The problem is not limited to faculty. Studies of campus attitudes to-
ward drinking find that students anticipate negative social consequences
for failing to participate in drinking rituals that celebrate intoxication as
a symbol of group identity, especially in fraternities (Nagoshi et al. 1994;
Perkins and Wechsler 1996; Baer 1994; for a review, see Borsari and Carey
[2001]). Yet Prentice and Miller (1993) found that students were privately
less comfortable with alcohol use than they (falsely) perceived other stu-
dents to be. The study suggests that, contrary to campus legend, students
are actually somewhat uncomfortable about excessive drinking, at least
when they are sober.
According to Prentice and Miller (1993), students in their college drink-
ing study are victims of “pluralistic ignorance,” a term first coined by
Allport (Katz and Allport 1931, p. 152). Pluralistic ignorance describes
situations where a majority of group members privately reject a norm,
but assume (incorrectly) that most others accept it (see Miller and
McFarland [1991] and O’Gorman [1986] for reviews). It is, in Krech and
Crutchfield’s (1948, pp. 388–89) words, the situation where “no one be-
lieves, but everyone thinks that everyone believes.” The illusion of support
is validated when it motivates widespread public compliance.
Pluralistic ignorance has been documented not only among groups that
indulge but also among those that abstain. For example, in Schank’s
(1932) classic investigation, the members of a religious community were
observed publicly endorsing norms against gambling, smoking, and drink-
ing that they violated in private. More recently, Kitts (2003) found that
students in five vegetarian housing cooperatives overestimated public sup-
port for dietary norms that were publicly enforced but privately violated.
Kitts tested relational explanations (“selective exposure” and “selective
disclosure”) against social psychological theories of cognitive bias. Con-
sistent with theories of pluralistic ignorance, he found greater support for
the relational effects of differential access to information about others’
compliance.
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Other examples are more disturbing. O’Gorman found that American
whites grossly exaggerated other whites’ support for segregation in the
late 1960s (1975; O’Gorman and Garry 1976). A similar pattern can be
found in other repressive regimes. In his book Private Truths and Public
Lies, Timur Kuran (1995b) points to widespread but illusory support for
the communist regime in the former Soviet Union, based in part on fear
of denunciation for revealing private opposition to neighbors whose ap-
parent enthusiasm for the regime was in fact equally a charade, and for
the same reason.2
A similar dynamic is evident in witch hunts. As noted by Erikson (1966),
witch hunts are caused not by an outbreak of deviance, but by an outbreak
of enforcement. Witches are created by anxious neighbors seeking to af-
firm their status in the community by accusing others of deviance, thereby
perpetuating the fear that fuels the need for affirmation. Those accused
can then save themselves only by revealing the names of yet other neigh-
bors. Perhaps no one in this population actually believes in the existence
of witches. Yet a terrified public turns out to cheer at the executions, in
public expiations of a collective anxiety that is of their own making. This
self-reinforcing dynamic indeed casts a spell on the community as pow-
erful as that of any witch.
We need not assume this dynamic is some historical relic of superstition.
Witch hunts were highly publicized on both sides in the early years of
the Cold War. Contemporary witches may also include gays assaulted by
young thugs eager to affirm their manhood. A study by Adams, Wright,
and Lohr (1996) found that homophobic men rated themselves as having
lower levels of arousal than other men when shown videos of homosexual
intercourse. However, physiological measures of sexual response were
found at higher levels among the homophobic men. The results suggest
that aggressive same-sex enforcement of heterosexual norms may be mo-
tivated by anxiety over the transparency of hidden deviation. Research
on adolescent gangs (Willis 1977; MacLeod 1995) shows how homophobic
humor is used to ridicule group members who lack the requisite toughness
and to affirm the status and loyalty of those who might otherwise become
suspect themselves.
The willingness to feign support for a public lie has also been dem-
onstrated under laboratory conditions. In a classic study, Asch (1951)
showed that participants would conform to a consensus judgment they
2 Kuran (1991, 1995a; see also Bicchieri and Fukui 1999) also highlights the potential
for rapid collapse, triggered when a few vanguards finally express their actual belief,
which encourages others to overcome social pressure and express their actual belief,
and so on.
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knew to be false rather than risk social isolation as a deviant. When
participants were assured anonymity, the false compliance disappeared.
It is not difficult to find other familiar examples of compliance with,
and enforcement of, privately unpopular norms:
1. the exposure of the “politically incorrect” by the righteously indignant
who thereby affirm their own moral integrity;
2. gossiping about a social faux pas by snobs anxious to affirm their
own cultural sophistication;
3. public adoration of a bully by fearful schoolboys who do not want
to become the next victim;
4. “luxury fever” (Frank 2000) among status seekers who purchase $50
cigars, $17,000 wristwatches, and $3 million bras, in an arms race
of conspicuous consumption and one-upmanship that leaves the con-
testants no happier but perhaps a bit less affluent.
Naked emperors are easy to find but hard to explain. It is easy to
explain why people comply with unpopular norms—they fear social sanc-
tions. And it is easy to explain why people pressure others to behave the
way they want them to behave. But why pressure others to do the op-
posite? Why would people publicly enforce a norm that they secretly wish
would go away?
One hypothesis is that very few would actually enforce the norm, but
no one knows this. If people estimate the willingness to enforce based on
the willingness to comply, and they comply based on the false belief that
others will enforce, they become trapped in pluralistic ignorance—an equi-
librium in which few people would actually enforce the norm but no one
realizes this. However, this equilibrium can be extremely fragile. As in
the Andersen story, all that is needed is a single child to laugh at the
emperor and the spell will be broken.
THE ILLUSION OF SINCERITY
A more robust explanation is that most people really will enforce the
norm, and for the same reason that they comply—social pressure from
others in the group, for whom mere compliance is not enough.3 To the
3 Norms mandating the enforcement of other norms are sometimes referred to as “me-
tanorms” (Axelrod 1986; Horne 2001). Explicit obligations to enforce can be found in
systems of collective sanctioning in which a group is made responsible for the com-
pliance of its members. A good example is an honor society that obligates individuals
to punish family members or fellow students who dishonor the group by cheating on
a spouse or an exam (Vandello and Cohen 2004). Classmates who fail to report a
student who cheated on an exam are also guilty, as are those who fail to report those
who tolerated cheating. In “cultures of honor” (Nisbett and Cohen 1996), a daughter’s
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true believer, it is not sufficient that others go to the right art galleries,
display the right body jewelry, purchase the right sports car, or support
the right wing. They must do it for the right reason. Zealots believe that
it is better not to comply at all than to do so simply to affirm social status
(Kuran 1995a, p. 62). Such compliance lasts only so long as behavior can
be monitored and social pressure is sufficient to induce acquiescence
(Hechter 1987). Thus, true believers reserve special contempt for impos-
ters. Those who comply for the wrong reason must worry about being
exposed as counterfeit.
The hypothesized anxiety is supported by research on the “illusion of
transparency” (Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec 1998). This refers to a
tendency to overestimate the ability of others to monitor our internal
states. Savitsky, Epley, and Gilovich (2001) found that individuals tend
to overestimate how harshly others will judge them for a public mishap.
Across four experimental studies, actors anticipated being more harshly
evaluated than was actually the case.
Applied to the emperor’s dilemma, the “illusion of transparency” sug-
gests that those who admire the emperor out of a desire for social approval
fear that their posturing will be apparent to others. They then look for
some way to confirm their sincerity. Enforcing the norm provides a low-
cost way to fake sincerity, to signal that one complies—not as an oppor-
tunist seeking approval—but as a true believer.
What better way to signal one’s sincerity than to act in a way that
encourages others to comply (Kuran 1995b, p. 61)? When one’s moral,
political, or professional “fitness for office” is challenged, people rarely
turn the tables on their inquisitors. If conformity is sanctioned, while
enforcement is not, conformists may be suspected of posturing in order
to gain social approval, but those who enforce conformity appear to be
the genuine article. This use of enforcement to signal sincerity explains
the apparent fanaticism of “new recruits” who must prove their loyalty
to the established members of a cult or gang, and it also raises the pos-
sibility that the thought police may actually be imposters themselves, a
sexual transgression dishonors the entire family until someone (e.g., the father or oldest
brother) restores the family’s social position by carrying out the obligatory “honor
killing.” Honor codes also obligate punishment of out-group members who violate
strict rules regarding displays of respect (Bourdieu 1966; Elster 1990). Failure to carry
out the vendetta leads to being labeled a coward and can result in further attacks on
one’s family (Gould 2000). Those who befriend a “coward,” in turn, come to be tar-
nished with the same brush. Simply put, every violation of the code of honor becomes
an acid test of everyone’s loyalty to and standing within the community.
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defensive tactic Freud (1894) called “reaction formation” (Baumeister,
Dale, and Sommer 1998).4
In the college drinking example, insecure freshmen who worry about
social acceptance may be tempted to drink—and to celebrate intoxica-
tion—in order to appear “cool.” However, they must not appear to be
motivated by this goal or they risk being scorned as a “poser.” Thus, it
is not enough to “party”—they must also express the belief that drinking
is cool and act accordingly, thereby adding to the social pressure that
leads others like them to join in.
Or consider those who pretend to appreciate some highly opaque
scholar in order to affirm their erudition.5 Privately, they have no clue
what the writings mean (if anything), and they worry that true believers
will see them as fakes (the illusion of transparency). The solution is easy:
simply disparage those intellectually shallow scholars who fail to appre-
ciate real genius. But when one does this, one adds yet another voice to
the chorus of intimidation that induces the insecurity motivating the be-
havior in the first place. The norm becomes self-enforcing.
Can self-enforcing norms emerge in a reluctant population, in the ab-
sence of any top-down institutional repression, or does it require a pow-
erful emperor to jump-start the process? Can unpopular enforcement be
entirely self-organizing? How many true believers are required to trigger
a cascade that pulls in the disbelievers as well? Do these cascades depend
on the structure of social networks? How stable is an unpopular equilib-
rium, and how large a disturbance is required for it to collapse?
One way to find the answers to these questions is to systematically
study norm enforcement in communities suspected of being trapped in
an emperor’s dilemma. Although it is not difficult to find empirical case
studies, it may be nearly impossible to find convincing evidence that the
supporters of the norm are actually imposters. It is not clear that people
even really know their own beliefs (Nisbett and Wilson 1977), given the
power of self-deception and the subconscious state of reaction formation,
but even if we assume that people have perfect interior knowledge of
mental states, they have no direct access to the mental states of others.
If people are unable to distinguish true believers and imposters, this may
also be true for social scientists, including participant observers.
These difficulties have led researchers to study unpopular norm com-
4 Based on their review of empirical work on reaction formation, Baumeister et al.
(1998) concluded that “people respond to the implication that they have some unac-
ceptable trait by behaving in a way that would show them to have the opposite trait”
(1998, p. 1,085).
5 This anxiety is supported by research on “the imposter phenomenon” and refers to
the feeling, common among academics and professionals, that one is an “intellectual
fraud” (Clance 1985).
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pliance through formal methods, such as game theory. It can be shown,
for example, that if an entire population is enforcing a norm that compels
intolerance of deviance by oneself and others, then enforcement of the
norm is a Nash equilibrium. Even if everyone prefers that the norm would
disappear, no one has an incentive to change strategy unilaterally—
thereby becoming the lone deviant in a population of enforcers (Hecka-
thorn 1990; Binmore 1998).
However, knowing that an equilibrium exists does not mean that this
outcome is likely or even attainable. A growing interest in out-of-equi-
librium dynamics has led game theorists to use evolutionary models to
study the emergence and stability of equilibria from a variety of initial
conditions (Skyrms 1996; Young 1998; Gintis 2000). However, these an-
alytic models are often mathematically tractable only if populations are
assumed to be fully connected or randomly connected. Yet research on
cascades points to the decisive importance of the structure of local inter-
actions (Watts 2002; Centola, Macy, and Eguiliz 2004).
Given these difficulties with traditional methods, computational mod-
eling can be a useful approach for studying normative cascades. An em-
piricist might object that computer simulation is just as much a fairy tale
as Andersen’s story. We do not dispute that, but we would point out that
fairy tales populated by computational agents are capable of attaining a
much higher level of logical consistency than those populated by char-
acters expressed in natural language.
On the other side, analytical game theorists criticize computational
models as numerical rather than mathematical, but as Abbott (1998, pp.
176–77) has noted, “[analytical] game theory will not get us very far
because it is ignorant, except in the most general terms, of a serious
concern with structure and with complex temporal effects. But simulation
may help us understand the limits and possibilities of certain kinds of
interactional fields, and that would be profoundly sociological
knowledge.”
Multiagent models can be useful for studying processes such as informal
social control that lack centralized coordination. These models focus on
how simple and predictable local interactions generate familiar but often
enigmatic global patterns, such as cascading enforcement of unpopular
norms. By looking for ways to generate these cascades under controlled
conditions in a population of computer agents, we may find some clues
about the dynamics to look for when we try to model the natural world
empirically.
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UNPOPULAR NORMS: AN AGENT-BASED COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
We model a heterogeneous population of agents who differ in their beliefs
and convictions. Each agent i has a binary private belief, , which definesBi
the agent as either a “true believer” ( ) or a disbeliever ( ).B p 1 B p 1i i
A small group of true believers (analogous to Andersen’s three rogues)
have such strong convictions that they always comply with the norm,
regardless of social pressure not to comply. When dissatisfied with the
level of compliance by others, they may also enforce the norm. We call
this “true enforcement” because the agent is enforcing compliance with
its true (privately held) belief.
The remainder of the population (analogous to Andersen’s citizens)
consists of skeptics (“disbelievers”) who privately oppose the norm, but
with less conviction compared to that of the true believers. This opposition
can lead them to deviate from the norm and even to pressure others to
deviate as well. This is also “true enforcement” because the disbeliever is
enforcing its true belief, which happens to be in opposition to the norm.
However, because their convictions are not as strong as those of true
believers, disbelievers can also be pressured to support the norm publicly.
This support includes not only compliance with the norm but can also
include pressuring others to comply as well. We call this “false enforce-
ment” because the agent is enforcing a behavior that does not conform
with the agent’s private beliefs. Thus, there can be three enforcement
possibilities:
1. true enforcement by true believers (who truly support the norm);
2. true enforcement by true disbelievers (who truly oppose the norm);
3. false enforcement by false disbelievers (who privately oppose but
publicly support the norm).6
At each iteration, each agent observes how many of its neighbors com-
ply with the norm and how many deviate. Agents also observe how many
neighbors are pressuring others to comply and how many are pressuring
others to deviate. These numbers are used to ascertain the level of public
support for and opposition to the norm. These distributions, in turn,
influence the two decisions that the agent must make—whether to comply
with or deviate from the norm, and whether to pressure others to comply
or to deviate.
6 In one experiment, we also allow for a fourth possibility: false believers who privately
support but publicly oppose the norm.
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Compliance
The compliance decision is based on the level and direction of social
pressure relative to the strength S of an agent’s convictions, where 0 !
. More precisely, we model agent i’s decision to comply with theS ≤ 1
norm ( ) as a binary choice, where if i chooses to comply andC C p 1i i
otherwise. Social pressure is defined as the sum of enforcementC p 1i
decisions by i’s neighbors. Each neighbor j who enforces the norm
( ) increases the pressure on i to comply, and each neighbor whoE p 1j
enforces deviance ( ) increases the pressure to deviate. A positiveE p 1j
net value means that there is greater pressure in the direction of com-
pliance, while a negative net value promotes deviance. A disbeliever com-
plies with the norm if social pressure overcomes the agent’s opposition,
given the strength of the agent’s conviction:
NiBiB if E 1 Si j iN jp1i
C p (1)i {
B otherwise.i
Equation (1) states that an agent can be expected to violate its belief (such
that a disbeliever complies and a believer deviates) if and only if the
proportion of neighbors enforcing falsification minus the proportion en-
forcing the opposite is sufficient to overcome the strength of the agent’s
conviction.7 Thus, in order for opponents of the norm ( ) to beB p 1i
pressured into compliance ( ), positive social pressure must exist,C p 1i
and for supporters of the norm ( ) to be pressured into devianceB p 1i
( ), negative social pressure is necessary.C p 1i
By default, we assume that true believers ( ) have maximal con-B p 1i
viction ( ) and therefore always comply, even if all their neighborsS p 1i
enforce deviance. For disbelievers, however, convictions are not so strong
and may be overcome if the social pressure is sufficiently positive.
The public compliance decision intersects with private beliefs to create
four agent types: true believers and true disbelievers (whose public be-
havior conforms to their private beliefs), and false believers and false
disbelievers (whose public behavior differs from their private beliefs, in
7 Although the model is dynamic and decisions are iterated, the model is not indexed
on time because we assume asynchronous updating, which means that agents decide
to comply and then enforce based on the pressures that exist at the moment of the
decision. Their decisions then alter the conditions on which other agents (choosing
later) base their decisions. To avoid order effects, we randomize the sequence in which
agents make decisions. To test robustness, we also replicated our experiments using
synchronous updating (in which all agents update their decisions at the same time,
based on conditions that existed at the end of the previous iteration) and found no
qualitative differences in the results.
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response to the effects of social pressure). By default, we assume that true
believers cannot become false disbelievers, because their convictions are
too strong to be overcome by any amount of pressure to deviate. However,
we also explore a special case in which private beliefs of false believers
( ) can eventually conform to public behavior ( ), creatingB p 1 C p 1i i
“converts” with . These newly converted believers have weakerB p 1i
convictions than those of the original true believers and could eventually
be pressured to “flip-flop” on the issue. Equation (1) thus also allows for
the possibility of a “false disbeliever” and shows the level of negative
pressure required to flip these converts (now with ) back to theirB p 1i
original behavior ( ).C p 1i
Enforcement
An agent’s enforcement decision is informed by concerns that differ de-
pending on whether the agent’s enforcement is true or false. Since false
believers are secretly opposed to the norm, they have no interest in pres-
suring others to comply with a norm that goes against their private con-
victions. Unlike true believers, who sanction to promote compliance, and
true disbelievers, who sanction to promote deviance, the false believer
sanctions to avoid exposure as an opportunistic imposter. The tendency
to falsely enforce thus increases with increasing social pressure to support
the norm and decreases with increased conviction, exactly as with the
decision to comply. However, we assume that enforcement imposes an
additional cost, beyond the costs associated with compliance.8 Thus, the
threshold for false enforcement is higher than the threshold for compliance
by an amount corresponding to the additional cost K incurred by those
who choose to enforce as well as comply, where :0 ! K ! 1
NiBiB if E 1 S K ∧ (B ( C )i j i i i( )N jp1i
E p B if (S W 1 K) ∧ (B p C ) (2)i i i i i i{
0 otherwise.
The top line of equation (2) is identical to equation (1), except that greater
8 To simplify the model, we omit cost from the compliance algorithm and treat the
cost of enforcement as the added cost of also enforcing a norm with which one is in
compliance. This added cost might be relatively small for sanctions based on social
approval or quite large for those based on material rewards or any form of disapproval
that carries a risk of inciting retaliation.
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social pressure is required to induce false enforcement than to induce false
compliance, by the amount K, corresponding to the added cost of en-
forcement. A false believer ( ) can be expected to enforce a normB ( Ci i
that the agent privately opposes if and only if social pressure is sufficiently
positive (i.e., supporters of the norm outweigh the opponents) to overcome
the agent’s reluctance to enforce, given both the strength of the agent’s
private opposition to the norm and the cost of enforcement.
Only “posers” feel the need to affirm the sincerity of their false behavior
by pressuring others to act likewise. For everyone else, the decision to
enforce conformity to their belief is more straightforward. This decision
is based on one’s interest in having others conform with the way one
wants them to act, given one’s private belief ( ) and the strength of one’sBi
conviction ( ). Thus, the effect of conviction on true enforcement is theSi
opposite of the effect on false enforcement. Conviction inhibits false en-
forcement (thus appears on the right-hand side of line 1 in eq. [2]), whileS
conviction promotes true enforcement (thus S appears on the left-hand
side of line 2). We assume further that the effect of conviction depends
on the need for enforcement. Agents only pay the cost of enforcement
when it is needed to promote the desired behavior, and they stop enforcing
when there is sufficient conformity with their beliefs that enforcement is
no longer warranted. For example, if everyone is complying, true believers
have no need to enforce, even though their convictions are maximally
strong. The higher the level of deviance among their neighbors, the greater
the need of true believers to invest effort in a campaign of social control.
Similarly, the higher the level of compliance among a disbeliever’s neigh-
bors, the greater the need for a disbeliever to invest effort to pressure
others into noncompliance with the norm.
The need for enforcement ( ) is simply the proportion of i’s neighborsWi
whose behavior does not conform with i’s beliefs ( ), orBi
Ni
1 (B /N )  Ci i j
jp1Wp . (3)i 2
Equation (3) rescales the aggregation of C over i’s N neighbors j (which
ranges from 1 when all j deviate to 1 when all j comply), so that the
result corresponds to the proportion of neighbors whose compliance be-
havior does not conform with i’s belief (which ranges from 0 when allBi
j conform to i’s belief to 1 when all j violate i’s belief). Substituting for
in the middle line of equation (2), the algorithm implies that agentsWi
enforce conformity with their private beliefs when conformity falls below
the level they are willing to tolerate, given their belief in the norm and
the strength of their conviction.
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We assume that agents can only enforce compliance if they have also
complied, and they can only enforce deviance if they have also deviated.9
However, given the cost of enforcement (K), it remains possible to comply
with a norm but fail to enforce it and to deviate without enforcing de-
viance. Thus, unlike the complementary rates of compliance and deviance,
the rates of enforcement for and against the norm need not sum to unity.
Everyone must choose whether to comply with the norm, but it is possible
that no one enforces anything ( ).Ep 0
Equations (1)–(3) require start-up assumptions about the initial levels
of compliance and enforcement. A conservative assumption in a test of
false enforcement is that agents initially conform to their private convic-
tions and no one enforces anything. Hence, there is initially no pressure
to comply, nor any pressure to enforce falsely.
We initialized the population as either fully connected or clustered into
small, ego-defined “neighborhoods” such that each agent has eight neigh-
bors. We fixed the distribution of beliefs so that the norm could range in
popularity from zero to nearly universal. True believers’ convictions were
fixed at 1.0, meaning that they were immune to social pressure. For dis-
believers, convictions were uniformly distributed in the range 0 ! S ≤i
(slightly above three out of eight neighbors), with a mean of 0.19..38
Although the mean conviction of true believers ( ) is over five timesS p 1i
that of disbelievers, they are also outnumbered 100 to 1, making the norm
highly unpopular overall. For a disbeliever with minimal conviction to
be pressured into compliance, there must be at least one more neighbor
enforcing compliance than enforcing deviance. A disbeliever with maxi-
mal conviction ( ) and eight neighbors requires at least four moreSp .38
neighbors enforcing compliance than enforcing deviance in order to be
pressured into compliance. The threshold for false enforcement is higher
than the threshold for compliance by the value of K, which we fix at .125.
For agents with eight neighbors, this means that at least one additional
neighbor must enforce before a false believer becomes a false enforcer as
well.
These values of conviction and cost form a cumulative uniform dis-
tribution of false enforcement thresholds across the population of disbe-
lievers, such that, for agents with eight neighbors, if two more neighbors
are enforcing compliance than are enforcing deviance in every disbe-
liever’s neighborhood, then about one-third of the disbelievers will falsely
enforce. If three more neighbors enforce compliance than deviance, then
about two-thirds of disbelievers will falsely enforce. And if four more
9 While agents may hypocritically enforce a norm they privately question, they never
enforce norms which they violate. We leave for future research the effect of hypocritical
enforcement based on the rule “Do as I say and not as I do” (Heckathorn 1989).
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neighbors enforce compliance than deviance, then just under 99% of dis-
believers will falsely enforce.
We tested several variations of equations (1)–(3) to assess the robustness
of the model, which uses a deterministic step function for the decisions
to comply and enforce. The step function implies that agents are indif-
ferent to changes in social influence at all levels of influence except for a
single critical value. We relaxed this assumption by replacing the step
function with a sigmoidal stochastic approximation (implemented as a
cumulative logistic function), in which the probability of the decision
increases with influence, such that the probability is 0.5 when the thresh-
old is crossed and approaches the natural limits asymptotically. The results
affirmed all conclusions based on the deterministic model. Moreover, with
stochastic decisions, cascades of false enforcement can be randomly trig-
gered in a population with no true believers, which is impossible in the
deterministic specification. However, the latter has the didactic advantage
of greater simplicity, and we therefore use the deterministic model for the
presentation of our results.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We want to know if a small minority of fanatics can force a few vulnerable
disbelievers ( ) to help enforce the norm, which will then increaseS ≈ 0i
the pressure on more stalwart disbelievers, triggering a cascade of false
enforcement that sweeps through a skeptical population. We also want
to see if this cascade process ultimately produces a stable enforcement
equilibrium that would persist even if every true believer were to exit the
population. To find out, we use a series of computational experiments to
study the emergent dynamics as we manipulate a set of structural con-
ditions:
1. access to information about the behavior of other agents (from global
to local, where local access limits enforcement pressure to neighbors
in a social network);
2. the frequency distribution and clustering of true believers (from less
than 1% to more than 99% of the population and from highly clus-
tered to randomly dispersed);
3. the network topology (from highly ordered networks to irregular
grids to small world networks with a much shorter characteristic
path length).
We explore network topologies using a two-dimensional cellular au-
tomata (von Neumann 1966) consisting of 1,000 agents located on a
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torus, with every cell occupied by one agent.10 In a regular lattice,40# 25
each cell has a “neighbor” (or social tie) to the immediate right, left, top,
and bottom. This elementary structure, called the von Neumann neigh-
borhood, is characterized by the absence of transitivity (or triad closure,
in which one’s neighbors are also neighbors of one another). If we also
include the four adjacent diagonal neighbors (creating a Moore neigh-
borhood), we create ties among neighbors, a property of social networks
that is supported by research in structural balance theory (Cartwright
and Harary 1956).
Although transitive social ties are more plausible than von Neumann
neighborhoods, the regularity of Moore neighborhoods remains highly
stylized. We relaxed the regularity of the lattice in two ways. First, we
created Voronoi diagrams or “irregular grids” (Flache and Hegselman
2001) that preserve the transitivity and overlap of Moore neighborhoods
but allow agents to vary in degree (or number of neighbors). The results
using irregular grids were identical to those using Moore neighborhoods,
so only the results with the simpler regular structures are reported.
Second, following the procedure used by Watts (1999), we randomly
rewired ties with probability P . With , the network is(0 ≤ P ≤ 1) Pp 0
a regular lattice, and with the network is completely random. AnPp 1
intermediate regime, called a small world network, is characterized by a
high degree of clustering with a low characteristic path length and has
been shown to be representative of a large number of social and biological
populations (Watts and Strogatz 1998). Using the standard nine-cell Moore
neighborhood as our baseline, we explore alternative network topologies
and observe their effects on cascades of false enforcement.
RESULTS
To preview the main results, we report three notable findings on the effects
of network topology and the distribution and clustering of true believers:
1. Embeddedness.—Although universal enforcement of a highly un-
popular norm is an equilibrium state in a fully connected population,
a dynamic model shows that this equilibrium cannot be reached from
out of equilibrium for a highly unpopular norm, supported only by
a very small number of true believers. Yet the equilibrium is easily
reached if an identical population is embedded in a network that
restricts interaction to small but overlapping neighborhoods.
10 We also tested lattices with up to 5,000 cells. Increasing the size of the network had
no effects on the results.
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2. Less is more.—Under conditions in which even very large numbers
of true believers are unable to quash deviance by disbelievers, a
much smaller number of true believers can successfully ignite cas-
cades that lead to near-universal compliance and enforcement of the
norm. Simply put, we identified conditions in which five true be-
lievers can accomplish what 500 cannot. By extension, when we
allow false enforcers to convert into true believers, it does not sta-
bilize the high-compliance equilibrium, but causes it to collapse.
3. Small worlds.—Bridge ties between otherwise distant neighbor-
hoods—such as the “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) that have been
shown to promote the diffusion of information, innovations, rumors,
and disease—are shown to inhibit cascades of false enforcement.
Experiment 1: Effects of Embeddedness
We begin by testing the effects of network embeddedness on cascades of
enforcement of a highly unpopular norm (less than 1% of the population
are true believers). Experiment 1 manipulates the distribution (random
vs. clustered) and embeddedness (global vs. local) of true believers and
measures the effects on the proportion of disbelievers who falsely comply.
Since clustering is meaningless in a fully connected population, these two
manipulations yield three experimental conditions: global, local  clus-
tered, and local  random.
Before turning to the results of experiment 1, it is useful to bear in
mind that in a fully connected population, even with no true believers,
universal enforcement of the norm is an equilibrium. That is, if we ini-
tialize the model such that everyone is falsely enforcing compliance with
the norm, then no agent will unilaterally change strategy and become the
lone deviant in a population of enforcers.
Nevertheless, the thin solid line in figure 1 shows that this equilibrium
cannot be reached in an unembedded population that is overwhelmingly
skeptical (less than 1% true believers) if the starting point is far from
equilibrium. Figure 1 reports the proportion of disbelievers who comply
with the norm as we increase the proportion of true believers from less
than 1% to more than 99%. For now, we focus only on the far left side
of figure 1 (expanded in the right-hand corner insert) as we compare
compliance rates among disbelievers in an overwhelmingly skeptical pop-
ulation that differs only in embeddedness and clustering.
In a fully connected (unembedded) population (shown by the thin line
in fig. 1), each agent surveys every other agent to determine the levels of
compliance and enforcement of the norm. If the population is overwhelm-
ingly deviant at the outset, true believers are readily willing to pay the
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Fig. 1.—Effects of distribution and embeddedness of true believers (based on 1,000 agents
and averaged over 100 replications at each parameter combination). The dark line indicates
an embedded population in which the true believers are randomly distributed. The dashed
line shows an embedded population with clustered true believers, and the thin line shows
an unembedded population. The dashed line shows how a very small group of true believers
must be clustered to produce sufficient pressure to ignite a cascade. As we increase their
numbers, dispersed true believers can randomly cluster to form a critical mass (dark line).
True believers have little effect on disbelievers in an unembedded population unless they
comprise about one-third of the population (thin line). Above that level, their effectiveness
diminishes due to high rates of compliance they observe among one another, which dimin-
ishes their zeal to enforce.
cost of enforcement ( ), but their numbers are too small to compelKp .125
even the most spineless disbelievers to join their crusade. Had this been
the Andersen fable, everyone but the three rogues would be laughing at
the foolish emperor.
So how did it happen that the citizens did not laugh, but instead ex-
pressed fawning admiration? We hypothesize that the explanation centers
on the assumption that social influence is not global but local.
To test this idea, we restricted agents’ observations to their immediate
neighbors and randomly distributed five true believers across a population
of 995 skeptics. The result (indicated by the dark line in fig. 1) is similar
to what we observe when information is global—everyone still laughs at
the emperor. Once again, the true believers fail to ignite a cascade.
But now suppose that agents are clustered by beliefs, a network prop-
erty called homophily, based on the principle that likes attract (Simmel
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1955; Carley 1991; Mark 1998; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).
When agents are clustered by belief rather than randomly distributed, a
skeptic exposed to a true believer can now expect to have other true
believers in its neighborhood. The results (shown by the dashed line in
fig. 1) now change dramatically, and the outcome predicted by Andersen’s
fable becomes almost unavoidable. When true believers are clustered,
even a very small number can spark a cascade of compliance.
To test the robustness of this result, we repeated the experiment, but
this time we matched the true believers with an equal number of dis-
believers who had equally strong convictions ( ). For the remainingSp 1
disbelievers, S was uniformly distributed so that the average conviction
of all disbelievers remained .19. Creating an equal number of “diehards”
on both sides (while keeping true believers badly outnumbered) had no
effect on the results. The fanatic disbelievers could not be converted and
always enforced their true beliefs, yet they were powerless to stop cascades
of false enforcement.
We also repeated the experiment using a stochastic version of the model,
in which the probabilities of compliance and enforcement are cumulative
logistic functions of the level of influence specified in equations (1) and
(2), respectively. Remarkably, the results showed that no true believers
are needed; cascades of false enforcement can be triggered “spontaneously”
by the random waverings of uncommitted disbelievers.
To better understand the cascade dynamics, figure 2 gives a stylized
illustration using a neighborhood with a cluster of three true believers
(white cells 5, 8, and 11) surrounded by twelve disbelievers (light gray)
at time 1. Each true believer is exposed to at least six deviants, which is
sufficient to overcome the cost of enforcement ( ), and 5, 8, andKp .125
11 begin to pressure their neighbors at time 2 (turning dark gray). Mean-
while, two disbelievers (7 and 9) are likewise exposed to the three true
believers, and this provokes them to fight back at time 2 by enforcing
opposition to the norm (turning black).
At time 2, the true believers now observe not only deviance but also
social pressure to deviate. However, given their strong convictions
( ), this pressure has no effect on their resolve. They continue toSp 1
comply with the norm and to demand compliance of others. Conversely,
agents 7 and 9 now observe not only compliance but also pressure to
comply from three of eight neighbors (.375), causing them to falsify their
beliefs at time 3 . With , we know from equation (2)(C ( B ) Kp .125i i
that this pressure is sufficient to trigger false enforcement by any agent
whose level of conviction is less than .25, which includes about two-thirds
of the disbelievers. Suppose agents 7 and 9 succumb to the pressure. Now
agents 4, 6, 10, and 12 will have three neighbors that are enforcing com-
pliance with the norm and zero neighbors enforcing deviance. Hence,
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each of these agents will now be triggered to enforce falsely. By extension
of this process, at time 4, the entire Moore neighborhood (agents 4–12)
begins enforcing the norm (all dark gray).
At time 5, agents 1, 3, 13, and 15 only have two out of eight neighbors
enforcing (.25). This pressure is likely to persuade them to comply with
the norm but not to enforce it (since the enforcement threshold is higher
by K). However, agents 2 and 14 now have three of eight neighbors
enforcing the norm, and no pressure to deviate, so they will most likely
join the cascade. Thus, at time 6, with the additional pressure from agents
2 and 14, agents 1, 3, 13, and 15 now have three neighbors enforcing
compliance, and they too join in. The level of compliance is now sufficient
that none of the true believers need to enforce any longer. Like the three
swindlers in the Andersen fable, they can quietly leave the village, know-
ing the citizens will now do their work for them.
Experiment 2: Effects of the Number and Clustering of True Believers
Experiment 1 showed how even very small numbers of true believers can
trigger a cascade of false enforcement in an embedded population, but
only if they are sufficiently clustered in a neighborhood to generate suf-
ficient peer pressure to trigger a chain reaction. Experiment 2 further
explores what happens as we increase the proportion of true believers.
The thin line in figure 1 shows that this effect is U-shaped in a global
population. As the number of true believers approaches one-third of the
population, they can trigger a cascade in a fully connected population in
the same way that three true believers can trigger a cascade in a local
neighborhood of size 9. (Of course, one hesitates to refer to this as an
“unpopular” norm, considering that one-third of the population now has
an unwavering conviction in favor of norm compliance.)
However, as we increase the number of the true believers even further,
their enforcement effectiveness begins to diminish. This happens because
true believers have less need to enforce as the level of compliance increases,
which means that the dynamics are self-limiting. In contrast, false be-
lievers feel more pressure to enforce as the cascade progresses—it is a
self-reinforcing dynamic. Thus, the larger the proportion of true believers
(who always comply), the lower the pressure on disbelievers. For example,
when there is an overwhelming majority of true believers (e.g., 90% of
the population), they observe that almost everyone is willing to comply
without their having to pay the costs of enforcement. Thus, true believers
do not bother to enforce their views, and the tiny minority of disbelievers
can enjoy an atmosphere of tolerance (but only so long as their numbers
do not attract too much attention from the majority).
We see a similar U-shaped effect in a population of embedded agents
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with randomly distributed true believers (the dark line in fig. 1). However,
the governing dynamics are somewhat different. As the number of ran-
domly distributed true believers increases, there is a greater likelihood
that a critical mass of true believers will end up in the same neighborhood.
Moreover, the larger the number of such clusters, the greater the odds
that a cluster will form in a neighborhood with disbelievers whose con-
victions are relatively low, such that a cascade can find a foothold. Thus,
cascades of false enforcement are more robust as the number of true
believers increases—but only up to a point. As in the unembedded case,
there can also be too many true believers for their own good. True believers
who are surrounded by compliance do not see the need to enforce, and
this situation allows fringe pockets of deviance to persist in a population
that is almost entirely compliant by conviction. Had there been fewer
true believers, they would have pressured nearby disbelievers to join the
cascade, who would have pressured other disbelievers, and so on, until
these pockets of dissent were eliminated by the self-reinforcing dynamics
of false enforcement.
Finally, we tested for the U-shaped effect in a population of agents
clustered by belief. When true believers are tightly clustered, it takes only
a very small number to trigger a cascade leading to universal enforcement,
as already noted. As their numbers increase, we might expect them to
become less effective, as observed for the global population and for a
local but randomly distributed population, due to the self-limiting dy-
namics of true enforcement. However, when the true believers are densely
clustered, we observe no reduction in effectiveness as their numbers
increase.
This remarkable scalability is caused by the existence of an ordered
boundary between the two populations. The ratio of the two groups along
this boundary is constant, regardless of the relative sizes of the two pop-
ulations. Even when the norm is very popular, the true believers along
the border are exposed to high levels of deviance along the frontier, just
as they would be if they were a minority in an isolated neighborhood.
This contact motivates the true believers to enforce, and the cascade then
fans out across the cluster of disbelievers, like a prairie fire. This boundary
effect suggests a structural interpretation of Erikson’s (1966, p. 19) em-
phasis on the importance in social control of “those we call deviants [who]
patrol its boundaries.”
As an extension of the experiment on the number of true believers, we
also allowed for the possibility that agents might eventually change their
private beliefs to conform to their public behavior.11 We therefore added
11 This change of belief to conform to behavior is hypothesized to occur under conditions
where social pressure prevents agents from changing their behavior to conform to their
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an algorithm that modifies agent i’s private belief based on the weightedBi
cumulative experience of false enforcement, relative to the strength of
conviction:
t t t t tR  lE B if E ( Bt1 i i i i iR p (4)i {0 otherwise,
t t1 t tC if (R 1 S ) ∧ (B ( C )t1 i i i i iB p (5)i t{B otherwise.i
Equation (4) states that cognitive pressure to reconcile a dissonant belief
increases by l with each decision to falsely enforce ( ), is unaf-E p Bi i
fected if the decision is not to enforce ( ), and is reset to zero shouldE p 0i
the agent truly enforce ( ). Equation (5) states that private beliefE p Bi i
is then reconciled with public behavior when the dissonance is sufficientBi
to overcome the “stubbornness” of i’s belief, given the strength of i’s
conviction ( ). The learning parameter l controls how quicklyS (0 ≤ l ≤ 1)i
private beliefs change to conform to public behavior. We set l at .0001
so that the cascade process would have sufficient time to complete before
private beliefs begin to accommodate public behavior (with ,lp .0001
nearly 3,800 updatings will be required before disbelievers with S pi
will change beliefs).0.38
Note that this experiment differs from the previous manipulation in
which we increased the number of true believers prior to the cascade.
Once the cascade has succeeded, one might expect increasing support for
the norm to simply stabilize the equilibrium of norm compliance. Sur-
prisingly, the effect is exactly the opposite. Figure 3 shows what happens
as false enforcers begin to believe in what they are preaching—the un-
popular norm destabilizes and eventually collapses.
The time series in figure 3 illustrates the emergence of an unpopular
norm in an embedded population with clustered true believers, followed
by the decay of false enforcement. Agents with weaker convictions are
among the first to be converted to false enforcers. As equation (5) indicates,
they also have a high susceptibility to eventually being converted into
true believers. At some point after the population reaches an equilibrium
of norm enforcement, weak-willed disbelievers, who have been falsely
beliefs. Significant research on cognitive dissonance and self-perception theories points
to this assimilative effect of behavior on beliefs (Festinger 1957; Bem 1972). Prentice
and Miller’s research on unpopular drinking norms showed a tendency for male stu-
dents’ behaviors and attitudes to gravitate over time toward what they falsely thought
to be the norm (1993). As William James said, “We need only ACT as if the thing in
question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by
growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real” (James [1890]
1981, emphasis in original).
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Fig. 3.—Effect of conversion of disbelievers (based on a representative time series for
1,000 agents). The solid line indicates norm compliance and the dashed line indicates norm
enforcement. The norm quickly spreads, and by time 80 the entire population is enforcing
the norm except the true believers, whose efforts are no longer needed. Disbelievers with
low convictions eventually begin to change their private beliefs, becoming believers in the
norm. With no need now to hide their posturing, they stop enforcing, which reduces pressure
on other disbelievers. At time 560, there is a steep reverse cascade from false enforcement
to widespread deviance, and by time 600, two-thirds of the population is refusing to comply.
enforcing for the longest time and are the least committed to their beliefs,
begin to convert. As soon as disbelievers become true believers they are
no longer complying because of social pressure and thus no longer feel
the need to prove the sincerity of their compliance by publicly pressuring
others. Nor is the weak-willed true believer willing to enforce out of
conviction unless the compliance level approaches zero (eq. [2]). When
these converted disbelievers stop enforcing the norm, there is less local
pressure on the remaining disbelievers, which also allows those with stron-
ger convictions to stop enforcing, further reducing local pressure. A new
equilibrium then obtains, characterized by behavior that is largely vol-
untary, with minimal enforcement (limited to a few of the original high-
conviction true believers, true disbelievers with high convictions located
near them or their converts, and false disbelievers who enforce out of
pressure from their true disbeliever neighbors).
Once support for the unpopular norm collapses, a new cascade of false
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enforcement does not begin again. In order to start a new cascade, the
original true believers need deviant neighbors with low convictions who
can be pressured into false enforcement (to prove their sincerity). However,
those with relatively low convictions have now been converted and are
no longer deviant. Although the original true believers still have strong
convictions, their newly converted but weak-willed neighbors now comply
with the norm, but their convictions are not strong enough to motivate
them also to enforce their views. The conversion of private beliefs has
robbed the true believers of the spineless imposters that are needed to
launch a successful cascade—the tinder needed for the fire. Paradoxically,
although the norm is not as unpopular as before, the population has been
inoculated against another cascade by the conversion of those with low
convictions.
Note the contrast with the collapse in Andersen’s fable. In the original
story, the spell collapses when a child laughs at the naked emperor. Our
model shows that the spell can also collapse for the opposite reason—
when the adult sycophants actually begin to believe they can see the
emperor’s clothes—a counterintuitive but logical possibility that has gone
largely unnoticed in the literature on social control.
Experiment 3: Effects of Network Topology
As a test of the robustness of our results across network topologies, we
repeated experiments 1 and 2 using von Neumann neighborhoods as well
as Moore neighborhoods of varying depth. As an additional robustness
test, we used a Voronoi diagram that relaxes the spatial regularity of
lattice networks and allows degree to vary over the population of agents,
as illustrated in figure 4. Across all these network structures, the results
were qualitatively the same, indicating that the governing dynamics do
not depend on network regularity (which is removed in the Voronoi di-
agrams) or clustering (which is zero in von Neumann neighborhoods and
increases with neighborhood depth in Moore geometries).
Further testing revealed that the spread of false enforcement does de-
pend on network structure, but in a way that is quite surprising. A growing
body of theoretical research demonstrates that increasing the proportion
of random ties in a regular network dramatically increases the propagation
rate of cascades (Newman 2000; Kleinberg 2002). We therefore tested the
effect on cascades as we perturb network order using Watts’s “rewiring”
technique, replacing local ties with random ties with probability P. Watts
shows how a very small number of random bridge ties between otherwise
distant pairs is sufficient to drastically reduce the characteristic path
length, with minimal reduction in clustering. The world remains “small”
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1032
Fig. 4.—Voronoi diagram. The shaded cells are neighbors of the clear cell in the center
of the neighborhood. The network retains the spatially ordered relations of grid structures
but without their structural regularity.
(i.e., highly clustered) but with remarkably few “degrees of separation”
between any two randomly chosen nodes.
One might then expect that random rewiring would also promote the
spread of false enforcement of unpopular norms. The surprising result is
that random rewiring not only failed to noticeably increase the rate of
propagation, but it actually inhibited cascades as the level of randomness
increased above a critical value of P. Figure 5 illustrates the effect of
reducing network order on the fraction of disbelievers who enforce the
norm. For a significant part of the small world regime ( ), cascadesP ! .01
of false enforcement are as robust as in regular graphs ( ). However,Pp 0
for values of , there is a noticeable decline in the magnitude andP 1 .01
frequency of cascades, and for cascades are entirely precluded.P 1 .1
The unexpected inhibiting effect of random rewiring is due to the de-
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Fig. 5.—Effect of network perturbation (based on 1,000 agents, averaged over 100 rep-
lications at each setting). A logarithmic scale on the horizontal axis highlights the steep
drop-off in the spread of false enforcements as P is increased. The sharp increase in the
effect of P at about .01 indicates a phase transition. Below that level, random ties have
little effect, and for cascades do not occur at all.P 1 .1
creasing fraction of overlap between neighborhoods as network order
decreases, as illustrated in figures 6 and 7. Suppose node A in figure 6 is
activated, along with all of A’s eight neighbors. With , nonadjacentPp 0
agents A and B share three common neighbors, giving them an overlap
of .375. So long as B’s activation threshold is below .375, the cascade is
guaranteed to move beyond A’s neighborhood, even if none of B’s other
neighbors are activated.
Figure 7 shows how rewiring reduces the average overlap between
neighborhoods. A is now connected to otherwise distant nodes, creating
a shorter characteristic path length for the network. However, A and B
now have only one neighbor in common instead of three. Pressure from
A’s neighborhood may be sufficient to induce B to comply with the norm,
but with , it is not sufficient to induce B to enforce. More gen-Kp .125
erally, as the network is perturbed, either by rewiring existing ties or by
adding new ties, the average overlap between neighborhoods decreases,
reducing the chance that a neighborhood of enforcers will have sufficient
overlap with nearby neighborhoods to propagate the cascade.
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Fig. 6.—Regular neighborhoods. The shaded cells are A’s neighborhood (enforcing the
norm), the hashed cells are B’s neighborhood (deviants), and the three shaded hashed cells
are the common neighbors of A and B (enforcing the norm). With , if the strengthKp .125
of B’s conviction is below .25, the pressure from these three neighbors will be sufficient to
make B enforce as well.
DISCUSSION
The results we report, across all three experiments, tell a very similar
story: cascades of false enforcement of an unpopular norm depend on the
spread of misinformation about the distribution of support for the norm.
Unpopular norms thrive on local misrepresentations of the underlying
population distribution. Simply put, it is a sampling problem. This is
more easily appreciated if we examine various conditions in which we
found that cascades fail:
1. in an unembedded (fully connected) population;
2. in an embedded population with a small number of randomly dis-
persed true believers;
3. when random ties reduce the overlap between local neighborhoods.
In the first case, the cascade fails because disbelievers have an accurate
estimate of the true distribution of public support for the norm. Similarly,
in the second case, the cascade fails because the distribution of true be-
lievers in each neighborhood does not deviate very far from the underlying
population distribution. Hence the information is not sufficiently inac-
curate to persuade disbelievers that the norm is far more popular than it
really is.
In the third case, random rewiring gives disbelievers access to infor-
mation from outside their Moore neighborhoods. These random ties to
otherwise distant nodes give disbelievers a more representative sample
and thus a more accurate picture of the true state of the world (see Merton
1968; O’Gorman 1986). Although we discuss this effect as the inhibition
of the diffusion of social pressure, we could also frame the effect as the
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Fig. 7.—Perturbed neighborhoods. A and B now have only one neighbor in common out
of eight (overlap is .125). With , B can no longer be pressured into enforcing theKp .125
norm by members of A’s neighborhood.
promotion of the diffusion of information. Random ties inhibit cascades
of misinformation by providing access to a more representative sample
of the true population.12
The results also converge around a second theme, one that calls into
question the conventional wisdom among sociologists ranging from func-
tionalists to utilitarians. Despite deep differences in their theoretical ap-
proaches, the functionalist and choice-theoretic accounts converge around
the prevailing idea that norms are enforced because they are useful, either
to society at large (in functionalist accounts) or to those who enforce them
(in choice theory). A prominent social scientist sums up the consensus
position very succinctly by noting that “norms of social behavior” can be
viewed as “reactions of society to compensate for market failures.” In
effect, when markets create a mess of things, society creates norms with
which to clean it up. Was this statement from a functionalist? On the
contrary, it was the economist Kenneth Arrow (1971, p. 22), expressing a
view recently echoed and underscored by game theorists Bowles and
Gintis (2001, p. 6) and by Hechter and Opp (2001, p. xvi). “The view that
norms are created to prevent negative externalities, or to promote positive
ones,” write Hecther and Opp, “is virtually canonical in the rational choice
literature.”
The emperor’s dilemma tells a different story, one that invites us to
revisit our sociological intuitions about how and why norms emerge and
12 In a study of norm perception among five vegetarian communities, Kitts (2003) found
support for the hypothesis that local interaction shapes the accuracy of norm percep-
tion. However, his research showed that structures encouraging local interactions led
to more accurate norm perception because individuals were more likely to disclose
their deviance with a friend, and close friendships tend to be clustered.
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spread. Contrary to both functionalist and choice-theoretic accounts,
norms do not necessarily solve social dilemmas, correct market failures,
or promote social welfare. Norms can also create social dilemmas and
undermine social welfare. When that happens, the real culprits are not
the true believers, whose motivation for enforcement increases with the
level of deviance. The key to the emergence of an unpopular norm is the
cascade process centered on the self-reinforcing motivations of those who
succumb to social pressure. Like a witch hunt, the process can quickly
spiral up into a powerful (and dangerous) social movement.
A CAUTIONARY CONCLUSION
We have used a highly specific model of social influence to explore the
propagation dynamics of unpopular norms. We do not mean to suggest
that we believe this is the only possible specification of social influence.
Rather, we used this model to show how these cascades are highly sensitive
to the structural conditions in which they occur, and to show how com-
putational models are useful tools for getting leverage on embedded dy-
namics that would otherwise be mathematically intractable. We believe
it will prove useful to explore alternative models of the influence process,
as a way to more precisely specify the loosely used concept of “peer pres-
sure” as the motivation to enforce unpopular norms. Using agent-based
models, three modes of influence can be compared:
1. Conformist influence, which is based on the false belief that others
are correct, as in herd behavior (Banerjee 1992) and information
cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992). This process
applies to the spread of beliefs that are uncertain (Sherif 1936) rather
than unpopular (Asch 1951).
2. Imaginary enforcement pressure, which is based on the false belief
that those who comply will also enforce, when in fact they will not,
as in the Andersen fable, in which a single violation (e.g., a child
who laughs at the emperor) is sufficient to disturb a highly fragile
equilibrium.
3. Real enforcement pressure, which is based on false compliance and
false enforcement, as in the model used in this study.
Note that these elaborations of our model to include alternative specifi-
cations of the influence dynamics are not intended to make the model
more realistic, nor do we know of any empirical studies that clearly favor
one mechanism over another. Rather, we propose these alternative models
as dynamic thought experiments in a program of systematic theoretical
research that explores a series of what ifs. The emperor’s dilemma model
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demonstrates the usefulness of this approach, especially for those inter-
ested in structural determinants of microsocial influence processes un-
derlying puzzling population dynamics.
We have also limited ourselves to a computational model of these dy-
namics, and here again, we do not mean to suggest that other modeling
techniques, such as game-theoretic approaches, would not provide ad-
ditional insights that we may have missed. Nevertheless, we encourage
readers to appreciate the particular strengths of this methodology. Agent-
based models of dynamic social interaction are more tractable (but less
generalizable) than mathematical modeling and more rigorous (but less
nuanced) than natural language (Hanneman, Collins, and Mordt 1995).
Expressed in natural language, a theory of enforcement of unpopular
norms has the intuitive appeal of Andersen’s fable, but we cannot know
if the intuitions can be trusted, or which assumptions were necessary for
the results. A mathematical model is useful for identifying possible equi-
libria in a fully connected or completely random network but not for
studying the dynamics of propagation across a population embedded in
a complex network structure. The latter turns out to be decisively im-
portant for the spread of unpopular norms.
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